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Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals in the stochastic strategy spatial prisoner’s dilemma game.
We equip players with the particle swarm optimization technique, and find that it may lead to highly cooperative states
even if the temptations to defect are strong. The concept of particle swarm optimization was originally introduced within a
simple model of social dynamics that can describe the formation of a swarm, i.e., analogous to a swarm of bees searching
for a food source. Essentially, particle swarm optimization foresees changes in the velocity profile of each player, such that
the best locations are targeted and eventually occupied. In our case, each player keeps track of the highest payoff attained
within a local topological neighborhood and its individual highest payoff. Thus, players make use of their own memory that
keeps score of the most profitable strategy in previous actions, as well as use of the knowledge gained by the swarm as a
whole, to find the best available strategy for themselves and the society. Following extensive simulations of this setup, we
find a significant increase in the level of cooperation for a wide range of parameters, and also a full resolution of the
prisoner’s dilemma. We also demonstrate extreme efficiency of the optimization algorithm when dealing with environments
that strongly favor the proliferation of defection, which in turn suggests that swarming could be an important phenomenon
by means of which cooperation can be sustained even under highly unfavorable conditions. We thus present an alternative
way of understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior and its ubiquitous presence in nature, and we hope that this
study will be inspirational for future efforts aimed in this direction.
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Introduction
Cooperation is the basis for complex organizational structures in
biological as well as social systems. Nevertheless, understanding
the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior in the context
of Darwinian selection remains a challenge to date. The dilemmas
of cooperation are usually tackled within the framework of
evolutionary game theory [1–3]. Although several mechanism
allowing for the evolution of cooperation have already been
identified [4], the resolution of social dilemmas and the closely
related avoidance of the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ [5] is still
considered an open problem. The prisoner’s dilemma game [6], in
particular, has attracted considerable attention in the past three
decades [7–10], and to date it is widely consider as a paradigmatic
example for the tensions between social welfare and individual
interests [11–33]. Cooperation and defection are the two strategies
that are at the heart of the prisoner’s dilemma game. In general,
while cooperators sacrifice some of their personal fitness for the
benefit of the society, defectors succumb to the temptations and
take full advantage of them. The prisoner’s dilemma captures this
situation by means of the following payoffs: mutual cooperation
yields the reward R, mutual defection leads to punishment P, and
the mixed choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S and
the defector the temptation T. The payoff ranking thus satisfies
TwRwPwS. In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game the
assumption that the mutual cooperation yields the highest
collective income imposes another constraint, namely
2RwTzS. This makes it clear that the rational (selfish) action
is to defect, and according to the fundamental principles of
Darwinian selection, cooperation extinction is inevitable. Full
defection is indeed the only stable Nash equilibrium for the
prisoner’s dilemma game in well-mixed populations.
Since the seminal paper by Nowak and May [34], however, we
know that this may not be the case for spatial interactions.
Although not universally applicable [35], spatial reciprocity is
recognized as a potent promoter of cooperative behavior, even
more so on complex networks [36–40] (for a comprehensive
review see [8]). Other prominent mechanism promoting cooper-
ation are kin selection [41], direct and indirect reciprocity [42–44],
as well as group selection [45–47], to name but a few.
Inspired by previous works on this subject, we here introduce
particle swarm optimization [48–50] to the players engaging in
the prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice [51], with the
aim of investigating its impact on the evolution of cooperation.
However, we abandon the commonly considered assumption that
the players can choose only between the two pure strategies,
namely to either cooperate or to defect. Real-life situations are
often more complex than that, and indeed there is a lot of gray
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here consider stochastic strategies, such that the cooperativeness
of each players is determined by W[½0,1 . W~1 returns full
cooperation, while W~0 returns full defection. These are the
two extremes recovered from our present setup. Between
0vWv1, however, there exists a continuous set of strategies
that can be considered either as predominantly cooperative (if
Ww0:5) or predominantly defective (if Wv0:5). Moreover,
while the evolution of strategies is traditionally performed by
means of different strategy adoption (or updating) rules (see [8]
for a comprehensive review), we here take a much less explored
avenue, namely by considering the aforementioned particle
swarm optimization as the driving force behind strategy
evolution. The particle swarm optimization algorithm is based
on a simplified social model that is tightly tied to the theory of
swarming [48–50]. A traditional analogy is a swarm of bees
searching for a food source. In this analogy, each bee (considered
here as a particle) makes use of its own memory as well as the
knowledge obtained by the swarm as a whole, to find the best
available food source. Particle swarm optimization can also be
considered as being representative for multidimensional search
(for example to find an optimum of a utility function). Typically,
a number of simple entities (the ‘‘particles’’) is randomly
positioned in the search space, and to each a velocity vector is
assigned, which is subsequently used to update the current
position of each particle in the swarm. Each particle then
proceeds by evaluating the objective function at its current
location, and finally to determining its movement through the
search space by combining some aspects of the history of its own
current as well as other potentially optimal locations with those of
one or more members of the swarm. Thus, the process makes use
of the memory of each particle, as well as the knowledge gained
by the swarm as a whole. The next iteration takes place after all
the particles have moved once. Eventually the swarm, like a flock
of birds collectively foraging for food, is likely to move closer to
an optimum of the utility function. Accordingly, the particles
(bees, birds, players) therefore should have a tendency to fly
towards better and better areas over the course of the search
process.
Here we focus specifically on introducing the particle swarm
optimization algorithm to the strategy updating process in the
stochastic strategy prisoner’s dilemma game on the square lattice.
In agreement with the above described general concept, each
individual is assigned a variable from the unit interval determining
its level of cooperativeness (or willingness to cooperate). Likewise, a
velocity vector is assigned to every player. Following this
initialization, each player makes use of its own memory (i.e.,
keeping score of the most profitable individual strategy in the past),
as well as use of the knowledge gained by the swarm (i.e., the
nearest neighbors) as a whole, to find the best available strategy for
itself and the society. In particular, the particle swarm optimiza-
tion algorithm makes use of the velocity vector to update the
current strategy of each player in the swarm. In this sense our
study can be considered related to previous works investigating the
effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation [52–57],
although it relies on an essentially different algorithm. The outline
of the latter is as follows: 1) Start with a set of strategies (i.e.,
cooperation probabilities W) that are initially uniformly distrib-
uted in the ½0,1  interval. 2) Calculate a velocity vector for each
strategy in the swarm. 3) Update the strategy of each agent, using
its previous value and the updated velocity vector. 4) Go to step 2
and repeat until convergence. All the details of this setup are
described in the Methods section, while here we proceed with
presenting the main results.
Results
We start by presenting the average level of cooperation, defined
as N{1 P
i W(i) where N is the system size and i runs over all the
players in the population, in dependence on the temptation to
defect b for different values of v (for the definition see the Methods
section) in Fig. 1. Expectedly, the average level of cooperation
decreases as b increases for all v. However, while for v?0 the
cooperative behavior dies out completely at high values of b, for
v?1 the average level of cooperation hovers comfortably over
1=3, even when the maximal b~2 limit is reached. For
intermediate and low values of b, however, small values of v
may yield overall higher average levels of cooperation. It is thus
intriguing to find that the introduced particle swarm optimization
in the strategy updating, fine-tuned by means of the parameter v,
can be responsible for the emergence of cooperative behavior
across the whole span of defection temptation values, as well as for
its dominance at low values of b. More precisely, two regimes can
be differentiated. For bv1:5 intermediate and high values of v
are actually detrimental for the evolution of cooperation, while for
bw1:5 the higher the v the higher the stationary level of
cooperative behavior. These results make it clear that low v (e.g.,
v~0:01) strongly support the cooperation level for small b,u pt o
b^1:2, whereas high v are much better suited for cooperation to
evolve under this dynamics in strongly defection-prone environ-
ments. At this point we argue that for v?1, when players imitate
their best past actions rather than the best players in the swarm
(see Methods for details), the proposed strategy updating rule
warrants the most significant benefits to cooperative behavior if
looking at the entire range of b values, thus in turn resolving the
prisoner’s dilemma.
In order to obtain an understanding of these results, we first
systematically analyze the impact of v on the final distribution of
strategies in the whole population for various values of b,a s
depicted in Fig. 2. Note that for v~0:01 the distribution of
strategies is very monotonous, while for v~0:99 much more
diversity is inferable. Both observations are virtually independent
Figure 1. Average level of cooperation in dependence on b for
different values of v. It can be observed that while imitating the best
performing player in the swarm (v?0) might be beneficial at low
temptations to defect, imitating personal success (v?1) is definitively
better for the evolution of cooperation in strongly defection-prone
environments. Each data point is an average of the final outcome
(stationary state) of the game over 100 independent realizations. Lines
connecting the symbols are just to guide the eye.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021787.g001
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every player to either adopt the most profitable strategy in its past
actions (v?1) or the strategy of the most successful player in its
neighborhood (v?0), these results can be understood very well. In
particular, for v~0:01 individuals are strongly inclined to imitate
the best-performing strategies in the swarm, irrespective of their
personal experience in the past. This narrow-sightedness inevitably
results in strongly polarized distributions, as only either pure
cooperators or pure defectors are the ones most likely to have the
overall highest payoffs. Note that this is because the payoffs are
directly scaled by W (see Methods). Conversely, for v~0:99 the
situation is very different since players will focus on their own past
actions and learn from them in order to arrive at the best possible
strategy. This has the advantage that, unlike for v~0:01, here
only the immediate neighborhood is explicitly taken into account.
For high values of b local considerations are obviously much more
important than for low values of b. In the latter case, the nearest
neighbors can much easily be neglected since the environment on
its own is not strongly favorable for defectors, and hence
cooperators can prevail even if overlooking the detailed distribu-
tion of strategies in their immediate neighborhood. An additional
advantage of small v, however, is that by focusing only (or
predominantly) on the best-performing players in the swarm, the
average level of cooperativeness can be maximized more efficiently
(as evidenced by results presented in Fig. 1). But if the temptation
to defect is strong the strictly local considerations are much more
important, as proper adaptation is then crucial for cooperators to
survive. Accordingly, for high values of b higher v yield better
results (higher average level of cooperation) by exploiting
effectively the whole array of available strategies to respond
properly (locally properly) to invading defectors. At low values of b,
however, these locally optimal adaptations (warranted by v?1)
might be less effective than the more globally inspired actions
(warranted by v?0).
These conclusions can be corroborated further by examining
characteristic snapshots of strategy and velocity distributions for
key combinations of b and v, as presented in Figs. 3 and 4.
Focusing first on the distribution of strategies in Fig. 3, it can be
inferred that for v~0:01, where only the most successful strategies
within the whole swarm can spread rapidly due to the workings of
the particle swarm optimization algorithm, the strategy distribu-
tion becomes very monotonous, leading to the isolation of
homogeneous groups of players characterized either by W~0
or W~1, respectively. This holds irrespective of b, only that for
strong temptations to defect the clusters of strongly cooperative
players become rarer. Note that in this parameter region the here
studied stochastic strategy prisoner’s dilemma game actually
becomes strikingly similar to the classical two-strategy spatial
prisoner’s dilemma game [34,51], where the clustering of
cooperators is the main driving force prohibiting the full
dominance of defectors. Conversely, for v~0:99, where the
particle swarm optimization algorithm is driven by the past
experience of every individual player (rather than the swarm as a
whole), highly heterogeneous kaleidoscopes appear, and it is
indeed this diversity that warrants a high level of cooperativeness
even by strong temptations to defect. In particular, snapshots in
Figure 2. Distribution of strategies in the whole population, as obtained for different combinations of b and v. It can be observed that
for v~0:01 the nature of the stochastic strategy prisoner’s dilemma game is essentially completely overridden by the selfish drive of players to reach
the highest current payoffs in the swarm, in turn virtually completely transforming the game to its two-strategy [only W~0 (full defection) or W~1
(full cooperation) strategies are present in the population] version. Conversely, for v~0:99 the full spectrum of available strategies is exploited to
arrive at the final stationary state. Note that the horizontal axis displays the willingness to cooperate W (defining the strategy of every player), while
the vertical axis depicts the probability that this strategy is present in the population. Depicted results are averages of the final outcome (stationary
state) over 100 independent realizations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021787.g002
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small amount of players with a high cooperation level (i.e., W
close to 1), surrounded by players with comparatively lower W
values. This in turn implies that not the clustering itself is crucial
for the sustenance of cooperation, but actually the aggregation of
such clusters itself, which enables the players with higher
cooperation level to survive the evolutionary process. Note that
the high cooperation level within clusters provides surrounding
individuals with a safe source of benefits that are sufficient to resist
the invasion of predominantly defective (i.e., W close to 0) players.
The particle swarm optimization algorithm thus spontaneously
generates the diversity needed for cooperation to survive at high b,
much by means of the same mechanism that was reported
previously for manually introduced heterogeneous states [58]. Of
course, players located in the interior of such clusters enjoy the
benefits of mutual cooperation and are therefore able to survive
despite the constant exploitation by defectors, yet this positive
effect is additionally amplified by the diversity and the hierarchical
local structures that give additional strength to the cooperative
strategy, while at the same time provide no benefits for defectors.
Moreover, by examining the characteristic distributions of
velocities presented in Fig. 4, we can obtain further insight with
regards to the evolution of the strategies and their adaptation.
Note that by means of Eqs. (1) and (2) (see the Methods section),
the two quantities are strongly interdependent. For v~0:01, even
though the snapshots are taken in the stationary state (where the
average level of cooperation is stable), the majority of players will
have the velocity very different from 0 (although on average over
time and space it is virtually zero, thus assuring the stationary state
being reached). This indicates that players will constantly try to
reach the currently maximal payoff in the swarm, despite the fact
that for the majority this will be unattainable. The locally high
velocity values also indicate that the evolutionary process at low
values of v is quite violent and fast, with the population therefore
unable to cope with high temptations to defect. Conversely, for
v~0:99 the situation is very different. Here the majority of
players will adapt their strategy very slowly to the changing local
influences, which yields the velocity profile for every player being
very close to zero. These conclusions are valid practically
irrespective of b for the two considered values of v, but the
average level of cooperation is in fact very much different. While
individually optimal past strategies in the particle swarm
optimization algorithm yield a slow but stable and very effective
response even to severe defector attacks, population-wide (or
swarm-wide) pursuit for extraordinary benefits proves insufficiently
effective to sustain cooperative behavior at high b values. The
latter approach, however, may be superior at low temptations to
defect, where local considerations are not so vital, and where the
pursuit of individual benefits can be successful even if driven by
globally-inspired fast and bold actions.
Figure 3. Characteristic spatial distributions of strategies, as obtained for different combinations of b and v. As concluded from results
depicted in Fig. 2, for low values of v only the two ‘‘extreme’’ strategies (with rare exceptions) are adopted, while for high values of v the whole array
of available strategies comes into play. Moreover, it is interesting to observe that values of v?0 yield the well-known clustering of cooperators [34]
on the square lattice, while the snapshots for v~0:99 seem to have these feature somewhat less pronounced, although still clearly inferable (note
that the distinction of clusters is somewhat difficult due to the continuous array of possible strategies). This suggests that, besides the clustering of
cooperators, additional mechanisms may underlie the survival of cooperators at high temptations to defect and v?1 within the present setup. The
color encoding, as depicted right, indicates the values of W for each individual player.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021787.g003
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In sum, we have studied the impact of particle swarm
optimization on the evolution of cooperation in the stochastic
strategyspatialprisoner’sdilemmagame.Thestrategyupdatingwas
guided by the particle swarm optimization algorithm, using as input
the individual memory of every player (i.e., keeping score of the
most profitable individual strategy in the past) as well as the
knowledge gained by the swarm (i.e., the nearest neighbors) as a
whole. By means of extensive simulations, we found that
cooperative behavior can prevail in large regions of the parameter
space defining the stochastic strategy prisoner’s dilemma game, thus
effectively leading to the resolution of the dilemma in favor of pro-
social behavior. In particular, we have demonstrated that imitating
the most profitable strategy in the swarm may lead to full
dominance of cooperation at moderate temptations to defect, while
imitating the best individual actions in the past may lead to the
survival of cooperative behavior even if the environment is strongly
prone to defection. We have also investigated the actual strategy
configurations in the population as well as pertaining spatial
distributions of strategies and velocities, for which we have found to
be closely tied to the setup of the particle swarm optimization
algorithm, and in fact instrumental for the understanding of the
observed promotion of the evolution of cooperation. We hope that
our work will offer new ways of ensuring cooperation in situations
constituting a social dilemma, and that it will be an inspiration for
future research when considering the very interesting combination
of intelligent algorithms and evolutionary games.
Methods
We consider an evolutionary stochastic strategy prisoner’s
dilemma game on a square lattice, consisting of 100|100 players
with nearest-neighbor interactions and periodic boundary condi-
tions. Initially the strategies of all players are drawn randomly
from uniformly distributed values of W in the ½0,1  interval,
whereby W determines the cooperativeness of each individual (or
the willingness to cooperate). While W~1 returns full cooperation
and W~0 returns full defection, between 0vWv1 there exists a
continuous set of strategies that can be considered either as being
predominantly cooperative (if Ww0:5) or predominantly defective
(if Wv0:5), hence constituting a stochastic strategy version of the
prisoner’s dilemma game.
Players interact pairwise with all their nearest neighbors,
thereby receiving payoffs that can be summarized succinctly by
the rescaled payoff matrix
Figure 4. Characteristic spatial distributions of velocities, as obtained for different combinations of b and v. Top row depicts results for
v~0:01, while bottom row features results for v~0:99. Irrespective of b, it can be observed that for v~0:99 the whole population essentially
becomes a swarm in that the velocities of all players are much the same and close to zero. The fact that the prevailing velocity is close to zero simply
reflects that the stationary state has been reached by means of adaptive, locally-inspired and slow strategy changes (which are, however, very
effective even if the temptations to defect are strong). For v~0:01, however, only isolated clusters can be considered to act as swarms, while the
majority of players cannot be associated with any kind of group dynamics and is simply caught in the futile pursuit for the highest, yet for the
majority unattainable, payoffs. These results indicate that swarming is an important agonist that promotes cooperation at high temptations to defect
(see results presented in Fig. 1). The color encoding, as depicted right, indicates the values of Vi,n for each individual player, where n was chosen
sufficiently large such that the stationary state of the game has been reached. Importantly, we note that for v~0:01 the stationary state has in fact
been reached, although at a given instance in time the average velocity in the population might be different from zero.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021787.g004
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D
W(i)   W(j)0
b   W(j)   (1{W(i)) 0
 !
where W(i) and W(j) define the level of cooperativeness of players
i and j, respectively. This setup entails b as the only free parameter
determining the temptation to defect, but it is well-known that the
essence of the prisoner’s dilemma game is thereby left intact [34].
The stochastic strategy prisoner’s dilemma game is iterated
forward in time using a synchronous Monte Carlo updating
scheme. First, each player accumulates its payoff by playing the
game with all four of its nearest neighbors. Subsequently, players
have to decide what strategy they will adopt in the next round (i.e.,
what will their new W(i) be), which we here determine by means
of the particle swarm optimization algorithm. Its implementation
is simple and intuitive, as follows. Initially, at time step n~0, all
players are assigned the same velocity Vi,n~0. For each following
n, the velocity vector Vi,n of every player i is updated according to
Vi,nz1~Vi,nzv½W(i,h){W(i,n) z(1{v)½W( ? ,n){W(i,n) , ð1Þ
and the strategy follows directly as
W(i,nz1)~W(i,n)zVi,nz1, ð2Þ
where in Eq. (1) W(i,h) is the most profitable strategy of player i in
all its past actions, whereas W( ? ,n) is the best performing strategy
in the swarm (here considered to be composed of the four nearest
neighbors). The parameter v[½0,1  determines the tendency of
every player to either adopt the most profitable strategy in its past
actions or the current strategy of the most successful player within
the swarm. In particular, v~1 implies that the player will
definitely imitate its past best action, i.e., the strategy that in the
past yielded the highest payoff. On the other hand, v~0 implies
that the player will copy the strategy of the currently best
performing player in its neighborhood. Intermediate values of v
interpolate linearly between these two extremes. Besides the
temptation to defect b, v is here considered as the second crucial
system parameter.
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